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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, officers from the New York City police and
fire departments responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center. That
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this Article and Jerry Ellig for his invaluable comments and continued mentorship. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of Gregg Miller, a champion of interoperability and a
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morning, police and firefighters entered each of the Twin Towers in an
effort to help those inside. Shortly after the South Tower collapsed, an
officer in a police helicopter hovering over the scene radioed to his
colleagues, "About 15 floors down from the top, it looks like it's glowing
red. It's inevitable."' Then another police pilot reported, "I don't think this
has too much longer to go. I would evacuate all people within the area of
that second building.
' 2
Police officers inside the building and on the ground heard those
warnings and proceeded to evacuate. 3 Most got out. However, because
their radios were not compatible with those of the police, firefighters inside
the tower could not hear the message.4 One hundred and twenty-one
firefighters died inside the North Tower when it collapsed twenty-one
minutes after the first warning was issued over police radio.
5
This anecdote from 9/11 is perhaps the best way to encapsulate the
problem of public safety communications interoperability. Plainly put, if
police officers are not able to talk to firefighters in their own city when
they both respond to the same event, the results can be disastrous. And it is
not just police officers and firefighters who need to talk to each other.
Emergencies can overflow to neighboring jurisdictions, requiring
cooperation between neighboring agencies. Also, everyday emergencies
elicit responses from many actors: police, fire, and Emergency Medical
Services ("EMS"), as well as local, state, and federal agencies of every
stripe. The attack on the Pentagon on 9/11 saw "900 personnel representing
50 secondary agencies responding to the scene just minutes after the attack
[and they] had no means of direct radio communications with first
responders." 6 This happens because jurisdictions often overlap. For
example, one emergency can take place within the geographical
jurisdiction of a police department, a sheriff's office, the state police, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). All must communicate in
order to coordinate an effective response.
Unfortunately, however, the agencies and jurisdictions that should be
able to talk to each other often cannot. The reason is that their
communications systems are not interoperable. That is, because they use
1. Jim Dwyer et al., 9/11 Exposed Deadly Flaws in Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2002, at Al. See also ThE 9/11 CoMMissioN REPORT 309 (2004), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
91 1/pdf/sec9.pdf [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT].
2. Dwyer et al., supra note 1, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. See also Editorial, Continuing Lessons of 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at
A26.
6. Douglas Page, Internet Protocol May Solve Communications Interoperability, FIRE
CHIEF, Mar. 1, 2003, at 14.
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different frequencies or transmission standards, one agency's radios cannot
receive or transmit messages to another agency's radios. A 2004 survey by
the U.S. Conference of Mayors found that about a quarter of cities polled
did not have a communications link between their police and fire
departments.7 More than eighty percent reported that they did not have the
capability to communicate with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"), the FBI, and other federal agencies.8 Forty-nine
percent of cities said they are not interoperable with the state police, and
forty-four percent reported an accident within the preceding year in which a
lack of interoperable communications made response difficult.
9
Lack of interoperability among local public safety organizations was
nothing new on the morning of September 11, 2001. Eight years earlier,
police could not communicate with firefighters just one floor away during
the response to the first attack on the World Trade Center. 10 Incompatible
emergency communications also handicapped the responses to the
Columbine High School shootings in 1999 and the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995.12 Little has changed since 9/11.
Cross-jurisdictional interoperability also remains a problem to this
day. While Shreveport, Louisiana's fire department radio system allows it
to communicate with police, EMS, and fifty other agencies in its region,
when the Shreveport firefighters traveled to New Orleans to lend a hand in
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, their radios were useless. 13 Police in
the area used a different system that was incompatible with Shreveport's
radios. 14 Similarly, destroyed infrastructure and the lack of interoperable
communications systems forced the Mississippi National Guard and other
first responders along the Gulf Coast to exchange information through
paper relays and face-to-face meetings, delaying emergency responses. 15
7. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY 6 (2004),
http://www.usmayors.org/72ndAnnualMeeting/interoperabilityreport_062804.pdf.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 8.
10. PUB. SAFETY WIRELESS ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY
WIRELESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE FCC AND THE NTIA 5 (Sept. 11, 1996) [hereinafter
PSWAC REPORT].
11. Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, Emergency Communications: The Quest for
Interoperability in the United States and Europe, 7 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2002/2003), available at http://www.ijclp.org/7_2003/pdf/mayer-sch-ijclp-artikel.pdf.
12. PSWAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
13. Jennifer C. Kerr, Lack of Interoperability Hampers Agencies, EWoss NEWS, Oct.
16, 2005, http://news.ewoss.com/articles/D8D985LO 1.aspx.
14. Id.
15. H. R. REP. No. 109-377 (2006), reprinted in A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 173-74 (2006), available at http://katrina.house.gov/full
_katrinareport.htm [hereinafter KATRINA REPORT].
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Not only is the interoperability problem not novel, but it also seems
that each time a major emergency exposes the lack of interoperability, a
new blue ribbon commission is convened to study the issue. Following the
communications failures that affected the first responders during the
Oklahoma City bombing, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration ("NTIA") jointly formed the Public Safety Wireless
Advisory Committee to study emergency communications. 16  That
committee studied the issue for a year and issued an 800-page report, which
concluded that "unless immediate measures are taken to alleviate spectrum
shortfalls and promote interoperability, Public Safety agencies will not be
able to adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in
a safe, efficient, and cost effective manner."1 7 Ironically, that report was
issued on September 11, 1996. After 9/11, the Department of Justice's
("DOJ's") National Institute of Justice created a National Task Force on
Interoperability, which has issued a series of reports.18 And after Hurricane
Katrina, the FCC convened the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks. 19 Information about the
interoperability problem is therefore not lacking.
Federal funding aimed at alleviating the problem has also not been
lacking. The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005
allocated $1 billion to public safety grants to be administered by NTIA for
the deployment of interoperable communications systems. In addition,
the Department of Homeland Security estimates that it has spent $5.6
billion on interoperable communications equipment grants between 2003
and 2005.2 1 Not surprisingly, the House select committee investigating
Katrina explained in its report that "[a]lthough some New Orleans and
Louisiana state officials attribute the lack of true interoperability for first
responders in the region to financial limitations, this explanation flies in the
16. See PSWAC REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
17. Id. at2.
18. National Task Force on Interoperability, The AGILE Program, http://web.archive.
org/web/20040604163924/www.agileprogram.org/ntfi (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). See, e.g.,
National Institute of Justice, Publications, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/204348.h
tm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
19. Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J. Victory as Chair of
the Federal Communications Commission's Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks (Nov. 28, 2005), available at http://hraunf
oss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-26245 AI .pdf.
20. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3006, 120 Stat. 4, 24 (2006).
21. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF GRANTs AND TRAINING
PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE, INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM 3 (2006), available at http://www.search.org/conferences/2006interop/agenda/
presentations/Keith%20Young%/o20- 20DOJCOPS-AUSTIN.ppt.
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face of the massive amounts of federal grants to Louisiana."
2 2
Despite the resources that have been dedicated to it, the
interoperability problem persists. To find a long-term solution that enables
completely interoperable communications between all necessary
emergency responders, we cannot be limited in our thinking by the current
system of public safety spectrum allocation, funding, or acquisition.
Conventional approaches to interoperability include patching two or more
incompatible radio systems using a gateway2 3 or simply encouraging
agencies to better coordinate their radio deployments without clear
incentives for them to do so. These approaches are born out of practicality
and encompass eminently sensible steps that can and should be taken
immediately to improve interoperability.
This Article, however, aims to identify the root causes of the existing
lack of interoperability and then address those causes. While there is a
pressing need to address the short-term demands of first responders,
another task that is just as important is a "wholesale assessment of long-
term spectrum needs" and policy. 24 The goal is not to suggest how existing
systems can be tweaked to allow a modicum of increased compatibility, but
rather to rethink public safety spectrum policy so as to achieve national
universal interoperability.
2 5
Part II of this Article explains that the lack of public safety
interoperability is the result of what economist Mancur Olson calls a
collective action problem, and it is the result of the national policy of
public safety spectrum segregation and balkanization. Part III explores how
market forces can be employed to solve collective action problems and also
surveys several successful commercial interoperable communications
networks shared by public safety users and private customers. Part IV
applies the lessons from the case studies and suggests an outline for a
spectrum policy that could harness market forces to alleviate the collective
action problem responsible for lack of public safety interoperability.
22. KATRINA REPORT, supra note 15, at 174 (citations omitted).
23. In telecommunications, a gateway is a network node that allows interfacing with
another network using different protocols. In essence, two networks are patched together at
a gateway, which translates the differing protocols.
24. See FCC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STUDY TO ASSESS SHORT-TERM AND LONG-
TERM NEEDS FOR ALLOCATIONS OF ADDITIONAL PORTIONS OF THE ELECTROMAGNETIC
SPECTRUM FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROVIDERS, para. 2
(2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-262865AI.pdf [hereinafter
NEEDS REPORT].
25. One of the findings contained in the FCC's recent report to Congress on the
communications needs of public safety is that "[e]mergency response providers would
benefit from the development of an integrated, interoperable nationwide network capable of
delivering broadband services throughout the country." Id. See also id. at paras. 12, 17, 19.
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II. WHY Do WE LACK INTEROPERABILITY?
Lack of interoperability exists when first responders who need to
communicate with each other are using either different frequencies, or the
same frequencies but with different communications standards. There
would be no interoperability problem if, before each public safety licensee
built its own communications system, it consulted and coordinated with
every other public safety agency to ensure that the system it built would be
interoperable with every other licensee's system. Better yet, there would be
no interoperability problem if public safety agencies agreed to share use of
the same network.
The armed forces, like first responders, have also faced severe
interoperability problems. During the invasion of Grenada in 1983, Army
Rangers invading the south of the island could not speak to Marines taking
the north because their respective communications systems were not
interoperable. 2 6 But this wasn't always so. The United States did not have a
large standing army before World War II. As it entered that war, the U.S.
procured all its military equipment essentially at the same time.27 By
default, then, the military was completely interoperable.
28
In the decades after the War, each branch of the military proceeded to
independently purchase communications systems that best suited its own
needs at particular times without coordinating with the other branches.
29
This was not aproblem at first, because until recently the services operated
independently. Once joint operations became more prevalent in the
1980s, the lack of interoperability that resulted from individual
uncoordinated decisions became painfully apparent.3 1 Like the military
services, individual public safety agencies make decisions about their
communications systems in an independent and uncoordinated manner.
32
In contrast to police officers and firefighters, the average consumer
has access to fully interoperable national advanced mobile communications
26. STEPHEN E. ANNo & WILLIAM E. EINSPAHR, COMMAND AND CONTROL AND
COMMUNICATIONS LESSONS LEARNED: IRANIAN RESCUE, FALKLANDS CONFLICT, GRENADA
INVASION, LIBYA RAID 36 (1988).
27. ANTHONY W. FAUGHN, INTEROPERABILITY: IS IT ACHIEVABLE? 2 (2002), available
at http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/faughn/faughn-p02-6.pdf.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Edwin Daley, Wireless Interoperability: A Key Element of Public Safety, PUB.
MGMT., May 2003, at 6, 6. "In the past, local and state public safety agencies functioned
independently of each other, with little need for coordination. When a field officer found it
necessary to communicate with personnel from other agencies, it could be done through a
dispatcher, who would relay information between them." Id.
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systems. A Nokia cell phone user on Verizon's CDMA network operating
on the 1900 MHz band can communicate seamlessly, by voice, text, or
video, with someone using a Motorola phone on Cingular's GSM network
on the 900 MHz band. Our mobile phone networks are not suitable for
public safety communications, 33 yet by their very existence they
demonstrate that there is no technical reason why public safety users
cannot achieve a high degree of interoperability among frequencies and
standards.
34
The first question we must answer is: why have public safety agencies
not banded together to form a universal interoperable communications
network? Part II.A suggests that the failure of public safety agencies to
achieve interoperability is grounded in policy and is fundamentally the
result of a collective action problem fueled by a national system of public
safety spectrum balkanization. Given that public safety agencies have
failed to create a national interoperable public safety network, the second
relevant question is: why has the private sector not successfully sought to
create and market such a network to first responders? Part II.B makes the
case that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a commercial
communications network to compete with the current balkanized system
because public safety agencies are subsidized with spectrum and therefore
face artificially low operation costs. Finally, Part II.C shows that the policy
of balkanization also results in economic and spectral inefficiency.
A. Collective Action Problem
The term "collective action" refers to activities that, in order to be
successful, require two or more persons or entities to coordinate their
efforts. 35 Collective action is therefore group action meant to further the
interests of the group. 36 A collective action problem is simply a situation in
which the rational course of action for the individual members of the group
does not coincide with the group-oriented course of action necessary to
,, • "37
obtain the "collective good. As a student of the collective action
problem has summarized, "individual rationality is not sufficient for
collective rationality."38
33. See RACOM Wireless, Why Can't We Just Use Cell Phones?, http://www.racom.
net/Downloads/Why/o20Not%2OCell%2OPhones.pdf; NEEDS REPORT, supra note 24, at
para. 32.
34. The military's historical interoperability also demonstrates that there is no technical
reason why interoperability cannot be achieved. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text.
35. TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1992).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1-2.
38. Id. at 3.
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In his seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups, economist Mancur Olson demonstrated that
large groups will not act collectively absent outside compulsion or an
independent inducement to individual group members. 39 The problem of
public safety interoperability is a classic example of the collective action
problem that Olson described. This Part will apply Olson's theory of
groups to public safety communications to show that although
interoperability might be in the common interest of all public safety
entities, individual entities have little incentive to assume the costs of
achieving it.
We often assume that if a group of individuals has a common interest,
they will work together to achieve their common goal. One of Olson's
greatest insights was that the size of a group determines whether its
individual members will act collectively. Small groups have a better chance
of acting collectively for two reasons. First, an individual member of a
small group may be better off if the collective good is provided even if she
has to bear its entire cost.41 That member will therefore undertake to
provide the good herself even if she cannot exclude others from its benefits.
Olson called such groups "privileged. ' ' 2 Second, in a sufficiently small
group, if one member stops contributing for the collective good, the cost to
the other members will rise noticeably such that they might refuse to
continue making contributions themselves, and the collective good would
no longer be provided.4 3 Realizing that this would be the outcome, a
member of a small group that values the collective good more than his
contribution will likely continue to contribute. Olson called these groups
"intermediate" groups.
Members of a large group, however, may share a common interest in
the collective good but nevertheless fail to coordinate. Olson called these
large groups "latent" groups because they have the potential to be spurred
to collective action either through compulsion or individual incentive. He
explained:
[The "latent" group] is distinguished by the fact that, if one member
does or does not help provide the collective good, no other one
member will be significantly affected and therefore none has any
reason to react. Thus an individual in a "latent" group, by definition,
cannot make a noticeable contribution to any group effort, and since no
one in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no
39. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1965).
40. Mayer-Schlnberger, supra note 11, at n. 89 and accompanying text.
41. OLSON, supra note 39, at 50.
42. Id. at 49-50.
43. Id. at 44.
44. Id. at 50.
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incentive to contribute. Accordingly, large or "latent" groups have no
incentive to act to obtain a collective good because, however valuable
the collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer
the individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization working in
the latent group's interest, or to br in any other way any of the costs
of the necessary collective action.
The group for our purposes is the universe of all potentially interoperable
public safety entities. The collective good is interoperability. This means
that every member of the group-i.e., every public safety agency-would
presumably benefit from interoperability, and it is thus a goal they all
share. However, the group is very large and thus latent. There are about
50,000 potentially interoperable public safety agencies in the United
46 .47States comprising an estimated 2.2 million personnel. Applying Olson's
theory, we see that no single public safety agency can make a noticeable
contribution to a group effort to achieve interoperability, and since no one
in the group will react if another agency makes no contribution, public
safety agencies have no incentive to contribute. Olson also pointed out that
the larger a group is, the higher the cost of organizing the group will be,
and therefore "the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person
acting in the group interest receives, and the less adequate the reward for
any group-oriented action[.] ' '4
We can therefore see that the collective action problem exists because
there are about 50,000 public safety agencies independently building their
own communications networks. This balkanization of public safety
networks is a result of federal spectrum policy.
All wireless communications systems-from cell phones to television
broadcasts to Wi-Fi networking to public safety communications-rely on
radio spectrum, colloquially known as "the airwaves." Generally speaking,
two uncoordinated transmissions cannot take place at the same time over
the same spectrum frequency. This is why one radio station will transmit
over 89.3 MHz, while another local station will use 90.1 MHz. If they both
transmitted over 89.3 MHz, you would not be able to hear either. So how
45. Id. at 50-51.
46. The number of public safety agencies in the U.S. has been estimated to be around
50,000, although an exact number is not available. See Sen. John McCain, Floor Speech on
Interoperable Communications for Public Safety Officials (Sept. 13, 2005), available at
http://mccain.senate.gov/press-office/view article.cfm?ID=139 (estimating the number at
50,000); WILLIAM L. PESSEMIER, Top PRIORITY: A FIRE SERVICE GUIDE To INTEROPERABLE
COMMUNICATIONS 11 (International Association of Fire Chiefs 2006) (estimating the
number at over 50,000); Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 11, at 18 (estimating the number at
almost 60,000).
47. PUBLIC SAFETY WIRELESS NETwORK, A PRIORITY INVESTMENT FOR AMERICA'S
FUTURE SAFETY 5 (1999).
48. OLSON, supra note 39, at 48.
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do radio stations go about coordinating so that they do not transmit over the
same frequencies?
The FCC controls all public spectrum in the United States, and it
doles out licenses to use the spectrum. One cannot legally use a radio
frequency without a license, 49 and the FCC takes care not to license two
interfering transmissions on the same frequency. The FCC, however, does
more than just ensure that interference does not take place. It also decides
to what uses a frequency can be put and who will get the license to it.
50
This is a process known as allocation and assignment.
The FCC allocates spectrum by first deciding for what purpose a
certain block of spectrum will be used. For example, in 1945 the FCC
decided that the spectrum between 174 and 216 MHz would be used for
television broadcasts. 51 No other type of transmission-cell phone, paging,
satellite TV, etc.-is allowed on that frequency range. Once the allocation
is complete, the FCC then assigns licenses to use the spectrum.
Historically, the FCC has accomplished this through comparative hearings
in which government officials examined competing suitors of the spectrum,
judged one to be "in the public interest," and assigned the license to that
applicant. 52 However, more recently the FCC has also assigned licenses
through lottery and auctions.
53
Spectrum used for emergency communications is similarly allocated
and assigned. The FCC or Congress will allocate certain blocks of
spectrum exclusively for public safety use. The FCC will then assign
licenses to use the public safety spectrum to end-users. However, unlike
other license assignments that can be won by anyone fit to provide the
service for which the spectrum has been allocated, public safety spectrum
licenses can only be assigned to qualified government jurisdictions.5 4 In
this way, public safety communications are segregated from commercial
communications in what Thomas Hazlett calls "spectrum apartheid."
55
49. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
50. Id. § 303(b).
51. THOMAS W. HAZLETT, THE U.S. DIGITAL TV TRANSITION: TIME TO Toss THE
NEGROPONTE SWITCH, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper
No. 01-15, 2001) at 2-3, available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.
php?id=179.
52. Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights,
Markets, and the Commons 3 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://assets.
wharton.upenn.edu/-faulhabe/SPECTRUMMANAGEMENTv51 .pdf.
53. FCC, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, ET Docket No. 02-135 (Nov. 2002)
at 9, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-228542AI.pdf
[hereinafter SPTF REPORT].
54. See, e.g., Public Safety Pool, 47 C.F.R. § 90.20 (2005) [hereinafter Public Safety
Pool].
55. Thomas W. Hazlett, Katrina's Radio Silence, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, available
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The effect of this policy is that each recipient of a public safety
license-that is, each agency or jurisdiction-must build out and operate its
own communications system. This arrangement has the advantage of
letting each agency or jurisdiction tailor its radio system to its own unique
needs. 56 At the same time, however, it has the effect of creating a large
"latent" group of over 50,000 licensees. Absent coordination, these
independent public safety licensees will not interoperate with the other
licensees in the group. As we have seen, members of large groups lack an
incentive to coordinate, and public safety agencies also often face
disincentives as well.57 As a consequence, they build custom systems
independently of each other, and these systems generally do not
interoperate.
B. Where Are the Entrepreneurs?
There are ways that a collective action problem can be overcome or
avoided altogether. Mancur Olson posited that members of a latent group
could be induced to rationally act in a roup-oriented way only through a
"separate and 'selective"' incentive. By this he meant that a new
at http://mason.gmu.edu/-thazlett/Op-eds/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20FT.Katrina. 10.26.0
5.pdf [hereinafter Radio Silence].
56. Jon M. Peha, From TV to Public Safety: The Need for Fundamental Reform in
Public Safety Spectrum and Communications Policy 5 (New America Found., Wireless
Future Program, Working Paper No. 15, Oct. 2006), available at http://www.newamerica.ne
t/files/WorkingPaperl 5_TVtoPublicSafety PehaFINAL.pdf.
57. For example, agencies compete with each other for resources, power, and prestige.
Police and firefighters, for example, often vie for the same municipal dollars. As a result,
strained relationships between public safety agencies are typical in most American cities.
New York City's "battle of the badges"--ongoing disputes over authority between the city's
police and fire departments that have at times ended in physical confrontation-is a case on
point. In that city, the NYPD's Emergency Services Unit, which carries out functions that in
other cities would be handled by the fire department, has increasingly encroached on the fire
department's ground. John Buntin, Battle of the Badges, GOVERNING, Sept. 2005, at 46,
available at http://66.23.131.98/archive/2005/sep/police.txt. Both agencies have laid claim
to command at emergency scenes that involve hazardous materials, and their respective
unions have vigorously lobbied city officials for the brief. It is not surprising, then, that the
9/11 Commission found that the NYPD and FDNY "each considered itself operationally
autonomous" and therefore "were not prepared to comprehensively coordinate their efforts
in responding to a major incident [on 9/11]." 9/11 REPORT, supra note 1, at 285. See also
9/11 Commission, Staff Statement Number 13 at the Eleventh Public Hearing of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (May 18, 2004), available
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/9 11/staffstatements/staffstatement 13.pdf; Joshua
Brustein, Revisiting 9/11, Reworking 911, GOTHAM GAZETTE, May 24, 2004,
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article//20040524/200/989; William K. Rashbaum &
Michelle O'Donnell, City Police and Fire Department Pledge Cooperation in Disasters,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at AI, B2.
58. Peha, supra note 56, at 5.
59. OLSON, supra note 39, at 51.
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incentive would be required that "operates, not indiscriminately, like the
collective good . . . but rather selectively toward the individuals in the
group."6 0 Olson called latent groups that acquire a collective good through
selective incentives "mobilized" because they have been stimulated into
action.
61
Consumers who want to utilize wireless communications could
conceivably license spectrum and build their own radio systems. If they did
this they would have to coordinate their actions in order to talk to each
other. However, this is a non issue because rational consumers have an
incentive to simply subscribe to an existing wireless network, both because
it is cheaper than building a new system from scratch, and because
subscribing to a network gives you access to everyone else on that network.
Any collective action problem is thus avoided because the individual
rationality (choosing the cheapest and most effective alternative) coincides
with the collective rationality (interoperability). The individual incentive in
this case is provided by commercial wireless carriers who themselves have
an incentive to offer the right mix of price and quality to consumers.
As the case studies in Part III will show, it is technically and
practically feasible for a private firm to create a network on which it leases
communications capacity to public safety agencies, much like commercial
wireless phone carriers sell subscriptions to consumers. A public safety
agency might join such a network if it was offered a selective ihcentive,
such as lower costs, better quality, or some other benefit that it could
internalize. Public safety agencies that subscribe to the same network
would be interoperable by virtue of being on the same system. If this is the
case, why haven't we seen the emergence of national interoperable
commercial public safety networks like we have seen in the consumer
wireless market?
Spectrum allocated for public safety cannot be traded.62 That is,
agencies cannot sell their licenses to willing buyers. An entrepreneur
looking to build out a national interoperable public safety network
therefore, cannot buy public safety licenses and patch them together.63
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Public Safety Pool, supra note 54, at § 90.20(a).
63. This is in contrast to consumer cell phone licenses. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is
Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 201-
02 (2003) [hereinafter Federal Preemption].
The U.S. market has gravitated to national networks because of economic
efficiency, not due to regulatory constraints or path dependency. Indeed,
regulators allotted thousands of local licenses, resisting any bias to impose
national scope on service providers. Economic rationalization via mergers, joint
ventures, and marketing agreements has driven aggregation of disparate franchise
areas into nationwide systems.
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Instead, an entrepreneur would have to purchase spectrum that is allocated
for more flexible use and which will likely have more lucrative alternative
64
uses.
Even assuming that an entrepreneur makes a public safety offering
over "private" spectrum (perhaps by also allowing commercial subscribers
on the network), she must still provide a selective incentive that will induce
public safety agencies to switch from their current systems. That could be a
price below an agency's existing operating costs or some other sufficiently
offsetting benefit. However, because public safety agencies are given
spectrum that they cannot trade, their operating costs are artificially low.
The cost of spectrum to a public safety agency is measured not by
what it paid for the spectrum, which is nothing, but rather by its
opportunity cost-i.e., the loss of a potential benefit from other alternative
uses of the spectrum, such as gaining income by selling it or leasing excess
capacity.65 As we have seen, the spectrum cannot be traded, and it can only
be used for public safety communications. This policy in effect insulates
public safety agencies from the true opportunity cost of spectrum.66 It will
therefore be difficult for a commercial network, which must absorb the true
cost of spectrum, to compete with what are effectively entrenched
incumbents that do not face the same average total costs.
Public safety agencies would face the correct costs of spectrum if they
were allowed to trade it or if they were allowed to make other uses of it.
Alternatively, public safety spectrum could instead be assigned by auction
to commercial carriers from which agencies could purchase their
communications capacity. In any of these scenarios we would expect to see
greater integration. So why is it that we have a policy of balkanization and
apartheid?
Although it seems logical that a police department should get the
license for police radio communications-and that some spectrum should
be set aside solely for public safety use-the rationale for such a policy is
not entirely clear. Law firms do not get licenses for the mobile
communications of their lawyers, nor is there spectrum set aside just for
Id. at 193.
64. Alternatively, an entrepreneur might lobby government for a new no-cost
commercial public safety allocation. Firms such as Cyren Call and Frontline Wireless have
recently done this, and the practice will be addressed in Part IV.A, infra.
65. See Mark M. Bykowsky & Michael J. Marcus, Facilitating Spectrum Management
Reform via Callable/Interruptible Spectrum 10 (Sept. 13, 2002) (presented at the
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), http://tprc.org/papers/2002/147/Spectru
mMgmtReform.pdf.
66. See Joshua Marsh, Secondary Markets in Non-Federal Public Safety Spectrum 8
(Sept. 2004) (presented at the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference),
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2004/384/tprc.pdf.
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lawyers. Some say that public safety spectrum is treated the way it is in
order to address a perceived potential market failure that would prevent
first responders from acquiring the spectrum they need.
67
For example, in 1987 the FCC issued its Public Safety National Plan
which governs the use of public safety frequencies in the 800 MHz band.69
One of the two objectives of the plan was "to facilitate interoperability
between communications systems .... ,,69 By way of introduction, the
order establishing the plan stated:
Two-way radio provides a vital component in this nation's public
safety and emergency medical infrastructure. Agencies involved in the
protection of life and property are able to do their jobs effectively and
efficiently only by making extensive use of a wide array of mobile
communications options available to them. Full use of these options
requires that adequate spectrum be made available and that its use be
well planned and coordinated to assure that the diverse needs of public
safety entities can be satisfied. To this end, the Commission has
allocated 6 megahertz of spectrum for these services and is adopting
this National Plan to assure that adequate and appropriate 4;equencies
are available to those who serve and protect our way of life.
The implication seems to be that because public safety communications are
so vital and important, we must therefore allocate ample spectrum solely
for that use and allow only first responders access to that spectrum.
However, there is no evidence that there would be a market failure in
public safety communications. Patrol cars and guns are just as vital to
police forces as communications systems, yet the market readily supplies
these goods.
Some argue that because emergencies are by their nature
unpredictable and because public safety users therefore need access to
spectrum at a moment's notice they should permanently occupy some
spectrum on an exclusive basis. However, Bykowsky and Marcus, two
FCC staff members, have noted that such a policy treats first responders "as
if they are infinitely 'risk averse:"'
72
The cost of such treatment is equal to the benefits society foregoes by
67. See id. at 7-8 (arguing that Ronald Coase's suggestion that all spectrum be
auctioned, and that public safety agencies bid for spectrum alongside private bidders, would
possibly result in an unacceptable market failure in which first responders did not acquire
the spectrum they need).
68. Dev. and Implementation of a Pub. Safety Nat'l Plan and Amendment of Part 90 to
Establish Serv. Rules and Technical Standards for Use of the 821-824/866-869 MHz Bands
by the Pub. Safety Servs., Report and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 905, para. 1 (2004).
69. Id. at para. 3.
70. Id. at para. 2.
71. See NEEDS REPORT, supra note 24, at para. 11; Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 65,
at 15.
72. Id.
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not having the highest valued user employ such spectrum during
periods of non-use by government users. While it is possible that these
foregone benefits do not exceed the value government users place on
not having to assume any risk, it is not entirely clear that this is so.
Currently, there is no process that generates information regarding the
size of the risk premium government users demand and society's
willingness to pay that premium. If [the] latter value is greater than the
former value, it would be possible to shift risk from goverynent users
to other users and, in so doing, make both parties better off.
Marcus and Bykowsky give the example of the Forest Service, which has
been assigned public safety spectrum covering the Rocky Mountains region
to help its firefighting efforts. 74 Most, if not all, forest fires occur during
the June to October dry season. Therefore, the Forest Service may be
willing to give up its spectrum during the November to May wet season
when there is very little risk of a fire. This would especially be the case if
the Forest Service were given an option to recall its spectrum in case of
emergency. Such an arrangement would transfer the risk of a wet season
fire from the Forest Service to the buyer of the spectrum, who would in
turn demand a risk premium in the form of a discounted price. In this way,
society no longer forgoes valuable services otherwise made unavailable by
treating public safety users as infinitely risk averse. As long as priority for
public safety communications is built into a network, there is no reason to
fear sharing that network with other users.
C. Inefficiency
The balkanization of public safety communications is not only an
impediment to interoperability, but it also results in waste and economic
inefficiency. This is because uncoordinated, independent communications
networks use more spectrum and equipment than if a coordinated approach
were employed. For example, public safety spectrum licenses can only be
assigned for a particular band with a certain number of channels.75 A small
agency with only a few officers would nevertheless be given such an
assignment even if they did not use all the capacity. 76 In contrast, a family
or a small business can purchase only the number of mobile
communications handsets it needs from a commercial provider, thereby
leaving the rest of the available channels to other consumers.
Carnegie Mellon engineering professor Jon Peha has calculated that
73. Id. at 15-16.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Jon M. Peha, How America's Fragmented Approach to Public Safety Wastes
Money and Spectrum 8 (Sept. 2005) (presented at the 33rd Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference), http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/438/PehaPublicSafety_
CommunicationsTPRC_2005.pdf.
76. Id.
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the number of antennas deployed by public safety entities nationwide
correlates less with population or geographic area than with the number of
political jurisdictions. This means that more antennas are put up, and
more spectrum is used, than is necessary to cover an area simply because
local agencies and jurisdictions do not coordinate to share antennas and
spectrum. Peha also points out that "the number of antenna towers, base
stations, and repeaters used by a public safety agency are largely
independent of the number of responders using that agency's wireless
system where this number does not exceed 100 and 85% of US public
safety agencies support no more than 100 users."
79
In contrast, a commercial network operator will not employ more
spectrum or equipment than necessary to produce a given amount of
communications capacity at a certain quality level.79 Commercial
management of spectrum has been shown to be consistently more efficient
than government management. 80 Unlike public safety users, commercial
carriers have an incentive, as well as greater freedom, to combine into
larger and more efficient networks. 8 1 Public safety agencies do not have the
same incentives because they do not face the true cost of spectrum.
For example, as the price of a good decreases, its consumption
increases. Because public safety agencies are faced with an artificially low
opportunity cost they will be induced to use more spectrum than would
otherwise be efficient and therefore waste spectrum. In contrast, public
safety agencies face correct opportunity costs when it comes to patrol cars
and guns. Instead of direct gun or car subsidies, police departments are
given budgets that they then use by weighing the money's alternative
uses. 83 Faced with alternative uses for a budget, a police department will
presumably not buy more guns or cars than it needs or can use.
Assigning licenses to end-user agencies also generates waste because
public safety agencies do not have a comparative advantage in designing
and building communications systems. Economist Thomas Hazlett has
likened the current public safety spectrum policy to "shipping each police
department tons of steel, plastic and rubber to make them responsible for
constructing their own patrol cars." 84 More aptly, it is like shipping them
the materials and then letting them contract with Ford or Toyota to build
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 65, at 10.
80. See Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 52, at 18.
81. See Federal Preemption, supra note 63, at 201-02.
82. Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 65, at 10.
83. Marsh, supra note 66, at 8.
84. See Radio Silence, supra note 55.
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for them a custom-tailored car. Most public safety agencies will contract
with communications services firms like Motorola to build their custom
system. This is inefficient because it inhibits economies of scale from being
achieved. While Ford can build thousands of one car model cheaply, if it
had to design and build only 300 squad cars, those cars would no doubt be
much more expensive. The same applies to radio communications. While a
mobile carrier such as Verizon has millions of customers on its network
over which to amortize an investment in an advanced network, the typical
police department has fewer than a hundred officers.
III. A POSITIVE SELECTIVE INCENTIVE
The collective action problem identified in this Article exists because
there is a large latent group of over 50,000 public safety agencies, each
potentially deploying its own incompatible communications system. The
question is, how do we ensure that each of these actors opts for a common
interoperable system? As noted earlier, Mancur Olson found that members
of large latent groups will not be motivated by anything less than an
incentive that appeals to their own individual interest and not to their
shared interest in obtaining the collective good.85 He further explained that
such a "selective incentive" could be either positive or negative. 86 A
member can be induced to act in the group interest by a threat of
punishment or the promise of an individualized benefit.
87
Examples of both approaches can be found in environmental
regulation. To abate pollution, government can take a command-and-
control approach and issue regulatory mandates backed by the threat of
fines or loss of permits. On the other hand, a market incentives approach
could be employed. Tradable emission rights could be assigned in order to
give polluters a financial incentive to invest in cleaner processes. In effect,
market incentives are leveraged to induce members of a group to act in a
group-oriented way.
In the case of interoperability, a command-and-control approach
would likely mean a top-down mandate requiring public safety agencies to
adopt a certain interoperable communications system. Perhaps the central
government would build out one shared network and require all agencies to
adopt it. While this would address the collective action problem, it would
preclude the benefits of competition among rival networks. Additionally, if
one standard or one firm is to be chosen by government, rent-seeking
behavior will also likely arise.
85. OLSON, supra note 39, at 51.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 51, n.72
88. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 11, at 39.
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Rather than a top-down approach, economic incentives can be
employed to provide a positive selective incentive to public safety agencies
in an effort to overcome the collective action problem. Such a policy
change can also result in efficient use of resources, including spectrum.
A. Spectrum Integration
Earlier it was noted that a law firm wishing to equip its lawyers with
mobile communications does not build out its own system, but rather
simply buys capacity from a commercial network carrier. But why is this
the case? In theory, a law firm could purchase spectrum, design a
proprietary communications platform, and build towers to support it. It is a
ridiculous proposition because the cost of self-providing would be
outrageous relative to the alternative: sharing a network with every other
consumer. A law firm--or any other business or individual consumer, for
that matter-has a financial incentive to find the most cost effective
solution.
As we have seen, however, public safety agencies do not consider the
true costs of their communications systems because they do not face the
opportunity cost of the spectrum they are given by the FCC. Unlike cars
and guns-which they would never consider building themselves because
they are not subsidized with glass, steel, or rubber-first responders do not
give a second thought to building their own communications network.
We should therefore rethink the national policy that balkanizes public
safety communications by subsidizing each agency with a spectrum
license. Instead of spectrum, first responders should be given budgets with
which they can purchase communications capacity from commercial
providers the same way they purchase everything else they need to fulfill
their missions.89 They should also be allowed to trade their spectrum. Such
a system would let public safety agencies face the true cost of their
communications choices and, like the law firm in our example, they will
quickly find that sharing a network is a more cost effective solution.
Commercial communications networks, by their nature, are
interoperable-at least among the subscribers of the same network. A
commercial carrier that builds out a network over unsubsidized spectrum
will want to maximize revenue from its investment. This means utilizing
89. How public safety agencies should be funded is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, one obvious solution is to take the advice of Ronald Coase, who suggested that all
spectrum frequencies be auctioned and made fully tradable, including those of government
agencies. Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 21-
22 (1959). Revenues from the auction of public safety frequencies could be used to fund
public safety communications.
90. Marsh, supra note 66, at 11.
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its network to its full capacity (i.e., signing up as many subscribers as the
network can handle). 91 Subscribers on the same network will be using the
same communications platform and will therefore have the ability to
communicate with each other.
Consider a police department that purchases cell phones for its
detectives from a commercial carrier such as Verizon. The department may
only want its detectives to communicate with other members of the
department-and it may even ask Verizon to block calls to or from
unauthorized phone numbers-but the ability to communicate with every
other of Verizon's millions of customers is built-in to the network.
92
By not handing out spectrum to each agency, but rather expecting
them to purchase however much communications capacity they need from
a commercial provider, public safety agencies are given a positive selective
incentive that overcomes the collective action problem. The large latent
group of public safety agencies will be mobilized to acquire the collective
good of interoperability, but only because they are seeking their own cost
effective communications solution. At the same time, many of the
inefficiencies of the current spectrum policy are also addressed. Writing
about a commercial public safety network in Europe, Victor Mayer-
Sch6nberger explained:
Having a private company construct and maintain the network
infrastructure required for a shared communications system provides a
number of advantages over public financing of a shared network. First,
it requires no initial investment from the public sector. The network is
built by a private-sector actor that arguably has better financing
expertise than a public sector organization and a keener desire to keep
expenses in check. Agencies are charged a flat monthly fee per radio
handset for using the network. This permits them to budget sensibly
and to switch to the new network without having to pay up front for
all, or even a portion, of the initial investment. Agencies have to
purchase handsets . . . . The network provider calculates the fixed
monthly fee it charges agencies based on the volume it thinks it can
attract, hence not penalizing early adopters. As with all network
infrastructures, the setup offers strong incentives to the network
provider to sign up agencies to use the service. Although this does not
solve the collective-action problem [immediately], it shifts it to the
network provider, which arguably has better expertise than agencies in
how to overcome it. For example, as with other telecommunication
markets, fee structures are possible that provide icentives for agencies
to switch, and the earlier the switch, the cheaper.
91. Id.
92. Of course, to achieve true universal interoperability, we would want competing
commercial networks to interconnect. Interconnection in the public safety context will be
addressed in Part IV.B, infra.
93. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 11, at 35.
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Additionally, such an approach would also address some of the
inefficiencies that result from the balkanized system. For one thing,
economies of scale will be improved. Unlike public safety agencies, which
are limited to the number of users on their force, a commercial network
will be able to spread the cost of the network over all of its subscribers,
perhaps encompassing several agencies and jurisdictions. In this way,
agencies that would otherwise not coordinate will share the same network
and not only achieve interoperability, but also use spectrum more
efficiently. 94 In large part this is possible because commercial carriers
design their networks to maximize revenue.95 That means making the most
efficient use of the spectrum at their disposal by eking out from it all the
possible communications capacity, while maintaining a level of quality
acceptable to their customers. Unlike public safety licensees, a
commercial carrier will not deploy more towers or spectrum than it needs
to adequately serve a geographic area or population. Finally, public safety
agencies will be freed from having to design and deploy their own systems
and will instead be able to rely on a professional provider with a
competitive advantage in interoperable communications systems.
98
We should also reconsider the national policy that allocates some
spectrum to solely public safety use.99 In order to induce commercial
carriers to provide the types of communications networks suitable for first
responder operation-as well as to address inefficiency in the current
system-carriers should be allowed to sell communications capacity not
94. Id. at 36. The article states:
Sharing network infrastructures among public safety agencies... will at least
permit agencies to share the cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure. It
will still be underutilized outside of emergencies, but at least every agency will
not have to operate its own overprovisioned and underutilized network and instead
will share with other agencies.
Id.
95. Marsh, supra note 66, at 4 (citing SPTF REPORT, supra note 53, at 10). "Recent
studies have shown that bands in use by CMRS providers (as well those used by television
providers) are highly utilized, while surrounding land mobile bands-notably, public safety
and others-have lower, more variable use." Id.
96. See Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 65, at 9-10.
97. See supra Part II.C.
98. Today, public safety agencies contract with communications firms to deploy their
communications systems. However, they ultimately build custom systems at the direction of
the agency. Also, it is in the financial interest of these firms to service as many custom
installations as possible.
99. See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, Protecting Public Safety with Better Communications
Systems, IEEE CoMMs. MAG., Mar. 2005, at 10, 11, available at http://www.ece.cmu.edu/-
peha/protectingpublicsafety.pdf. "[T]he US should reevaluate the traditional separation
between public safety systems and commercial systems .... [It] should also reconsider
spectrum management policies that force commercial systems and public safety systems to
operate in different spectrum bands." Id.
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only to public safety agencies, but also to private users who would share
the spectrum with first responders. Desegregating public safety spectrum
would further improve economies of scale by allowing a network's pool of
users to grow to many times the number that would be achieved if only
public safety users were allowed on the network. While there are only an
estimated 3 million public safety communications users today, there are
over 80 million cell phone users in a comparable amount of spectrum. 10
0
In a paper proposing secondary markets in public safety spectrum,
Joshua Marsh explained that in fact, public safety and commercial mobile
use of spectrum is opposite and therefore complementary:
Public safety wireless communications systems and [Consumer Mobile
Radio Service] CMRS systems are designed to meet very different
traffic patterns. These differing traffic patterns, interestingly, may lead
to compatibilities due to their complimentary[sic] nature. In other
words, the most compatible systems for sharing are those with
completely opposite usage patterns. While CMRS and public safety do
not form perfect pd posites, their traffic patterns are somewhat
complimentary[sic].
Spectrum bands used by consumer wireless services are highly utilized,
while surrounding public safety bands have a lower and more variable102
use. This is because public safety wireless communications systems areS103
designed to be able to cope with large-scale emergencies. However, such
catastrophes are rare, and on a day-to-day basis public safety agencies use
only a fraction of their capacity, thus wasting spectrum. In contrast,
commercial wireless networks are designed to maximize the number of
possible connections within a band given certain quality parameters.1°5 By
allowing spectrum to be shared, public safety bands that now lie largely
fallow can be put to productive use. Also, by allowing full use of spectrum
now limited to public safety use, economies of scale can be further
enlarged. As is apparent in the consumer mobile market, larger economies
of scale result in efficiencies in research and development, management,
and other functionalities that lead to greater innovation and more advanced
networks. 1
0 6
100. James Jay Carafano, Talking Through Disasters: The Federal Role in Emergency
Communications, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., D.C.), July 17, 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.thebreakingnews.com/files/articles/heritage-found-government-communiation-
report.pdf.
101. Marsh, supra note 66, at 10-11.
102. Id. at 4 (citing SPTF REPORT, supra note 53, at 10).
103. Marsh, supra note 66, at 11.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Federal Preemption, supra note 63, at 202.
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B. Case Studies
A public-private partnership that encourages for-profit commercial
networks selling communications capacity on a shared basis to first
responders and private parties might sound radical. It should not. The fact
is that it has already been done successfully. This Part looks at several
successful implementations of private provision of public safety
communications, 107 as well as commercial networks shared by first
responders and private customers.
1. Walky-Talky
Europe has been more willing to embrace private solutions for public
safety communications. Mayer-Sch6nberger writes about Walky-Talky, a
company in Austria that provides communications to public safety in the
Burgenland. That state's thirty-year-old EMS analog radio system was
deteriorating and often failed. ° 8 A group of entrepreneurs proposed
building a new network based on the European TETRA standard and to
lease use of the network to public safety agencies for a fee. °9 Burgenland's
EMS agency became Walky-Talky's first customer in 1999, and by 2000
the network covered over ninety percent of the entire state and supported
600 radios, including those of firefighters and law enforcement agencies. I°
Walky-Talky quickly realized, however, that it was not making the
most effective use of its network's capacity:
[It found that] EMS agencies have base-level traffic all day as they
tend to routine tasks and smaller accidents. Communication traffic
swells in the case of a larger accident. In contrast, the traffic pattern for
local firefighter units, consisting mostly of volunteers, is quite
different: Ordinarily there is almost no communication traffic, but once
there is a fire, dozens and dozens of users have to be contacted at once.
Whereas EMS agencies use a communications network continuously,
firefighters essentially pay for it being provided in case of an
emergency. This leaves a typical public safety network, over
provisioned to accommodate even heavy traffic in case of a large
emergency, underutilized. Adding user groups with more continuous
communication needs, like EMS or law enforcement agencies, may
somewhat balance the load in times of no or only small emergencies.
107. In Part II.B., supra, the case was made that it would be difficult for a new
commercial network to compete given the entrenched system of public safety spectrum
subsidization. In the case studies that follow, note that in each case the government was not
making a choice between staying with its existing system and switching to a new one.
Instead, the commercial networks were replacing an outmoded radio system and the choice,
therefore, was between a new commercial system and a new public system. Additionally,
note that in each case the government acquired its spectrum by assignment, not purchase.
108. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 11, at 34.
109. Id. at 34-35.
110. Id.at35.
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But the benefits of such a balance are lost once a large emergency
requires all agencies-firefighters, police, and EMS-to use the radio
network very actively. What Walky-Talky needed, as a supplement to
its public safety usage base, were public-sector i11rs that would want
continuous, but not time-critical, communication.
To that end Walky-Talky took on new government customers that did not
• • • 112
require continuous time-critical communications. These included
roadwork crews, park rangers, and environmental protection officers. For
example, "[t]he TETRA network was used to transmit street temperature
and other weather data along3 the interstate to central command and to
control ice-warning signals."" However, there is no reason why such a
commercial network must limit itself to public sector users when private.
customers would also be eager to buy access.
2. RACOM
That is exactly what RACOM Wireless, a small company in
Marshalltown, Iowa, has been doing for the past twelve years. It has built a
private advanced wireless network on nonpublic-safety spectrum licensed
to it. Communications on the network are interoperable, and subscribers
include not just public safety agencies but private businesses as well.
Gregg Miller started the company in 1972 and first offered wireless
communications to farmers."14 It used G.E. analog wireless telephone
technology over 800 MHz spectrum that the FCC licensed to RACOM.
115
As cell phones became more prevalent in the 1980s, Miller transitioned
RACOM to the public safety communications business. In 1994, the Polk
County Sheriffs Office-which serves Des Moines-solicited bids to
build a new radio communications system for the police force. RACOM,
Motorola, M/A-COM, and others submitted proposals. RACOM won the
contract contingent on voter approval of a bond issue to fund the new
network. Before the election, however, RACOM's competitors engaged in
a successful public relations campaign against the bond issue, which failed
at the polls.
The communications system at the sheriffs office was about twenty
years old and needed at least an interim replacement. City Council
members spoke with Miller and together they came up with a plan.
RACOM had its existing 800 MHz commercial network. The Council
could raise enough money to buy radios to work on that network, and
111. Id. at 36.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Telephone Interview with Michael Miller, President and CEO, RACOM Corp.
(Nov. 7, 2006).
115. Id.
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RACOM could just charge them a monthly access fee. Miller soon had the
next obvious thought: Why should this only be an intermediate solution?
The Polk County Sheriffs Office became the first public safety
subscriber to the RACOM network, and to this day it is that agency's
primary means of voice communications. The network is completely
interoperable, which means that any user on it can talk to any other user.
Most public safety agencies in RACOM's service area-such as the Sioux
City police and fire departments-use RACOM's network for their
communications. 116 However, the network also carries communications
from many commercial customers, such as private roadwork contractors
and industrial plants, including those of John Deere and Rockwell
Collins.1 17 Utilities such as gas, water, and electric, also subscribe to the
RACOM network. Today, the RACOM network carries traffic from
about 10,000 radio units, seventy percent of which belong to public safety
users. Fifteen percent of the users are utilities, and the other fifteen percent
are private enterprises. The network handles over 50 million voice calls a
month over 100 individual tower sites.
Day-to-day, police, fire, and other agencies keep to their own private
channels.119 It is not a free-for-all in which everyone can hear everyone.
120
However, in case of emergency, first responders do have the ability to
switch to each others' channels or to predetermined "incident channels" to
coordinate. 12 1 They can also talk to commercial users of the network to
coordinate response to an emergency. 122 For example, firefighters often
have to radio their dispatchers to request that they telephone the gas
utility's dispatcher who in turn will radio a technician to ask her to turn off
service to a building. 123 This communications daisy chain is avoided on the
RACOM network because firefighters can communicate directly with
utility technicians.124
RACOM subscribers can also use their radios peer-to-peer. 125 This
means that even if the network is down, one handset can communicate
116. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, Former President and CEO, RACOM
Corp. (Aug. 11, 2006).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Telephone Interview with Michael Miller, supra note 114.
123. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116; Telephone Interview with
Michael Miller, supra note 114.
124. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116; Telephone Interview with
Michael Miller, supra note 114.
125. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116.
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directly with another. This is an invaluable feature in emergency situations,
as well as inside buildings and in other places where network coverage
does not extend. However, if each of a pair of radios belonged to a
disparate custom-built public safety network, then the chances that the two
radios will communicate directly are slim.
Charges for use of the network are negotiated with each subscriber.
Customers purchase their own radio units and pay a monthly charge for
each handset they use. That charge depends on the capacity required by the
customer. For example, a prison on RACOM's network that only needs
localized communications pays $3 to $4 per month per handset, while other
public safety agencies requiring better service pay about $15 to $25. 126
Network usage is unlimited.1
2 7
RACOM was, and still is, in the business of deploying and
maintaining custom-built communications systems for public safety
agencies. However, most of its customers have become subscribers of the
network. 128 RACOM president, Gregg Miller, explained in an interview:
"The proposition we made to our clients was, 'Use our network or, if you
insist, we'll build you your own and we'll do our best to make it
interoperate with ours. '129 That is an attractive value proposition because
joining the RACOM network is cheaper than building a custom system.
Given this positive selective inducement, most local public safety agencies
in its coverage area joined.
Miller explains that what often happens is that an agency not on the
network, such as a police department, will purchase access to the network
for one radio to be held by the chief. This is often done to ensure at least a
modicum of interoperability with neighboring agencies and jurisdictions
that are on the RACOM network. 130 According to Miller, after using the
radio for some time, the chief will realize how useful and cost effective the
network is and will purchase more and more radios for the department-
126. Telephone Interview with Michael Miller, supra note 114.
127. Extra charges apply for special services such as interconnecting with the telephone
network or GPS applications. Id.
128. Id.
129. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116.
130. See Steve Worrall, An International Study of Radio Interoperability 22 (Dec. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.bapco.org.uk/?page=BAPCObursary2005%20report
.pdf (explaining that the simplest level of interoperability is achieved when different
agencies exchange radios); NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON INTEROPERABILITY, WHY CAN'T WE
TALK? WORKING TOGETHER TO BRIDGE THE COMMUNICATIONS GAP TO SAVE LIVES: A GUIDE
FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS 7 (Feb. 2003), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/204348.pdf
(explaining that "law enforcement, emergency medical services (EMS), and firefighters
sometimes have to juggle as many as five different radios because each agency
communicates on different systems[.]").
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each unit interoperable with every other on the RACOM network. 131
"Interoperability happens on the RACOM network because it is part
of the package; it is a take it or leave it proposition . . ." Miller says. "If
you're an agency in the area and want to buy [communications capacity]
from RACOM, you have to be interoperable with everyone."' 132 In this
way, the public safety agencies on RACOM's network become
interoperable unintentionally by simply opting to pursue their own self-
interest.
The novelty of joining a commercial network certainly put off some
public safety agencies. But as Gregg Miller would point out to them, the
alternative was for a private company-often RACOM itself-to build and
maintain a custom communications network. If an agency can trust a
private company to be responsible for its proprietary communications
network, why distrust a private network that is serviced by the same
technicians?
The Iowa Department of Public Health's Health Alert Network
("HAN") was RACOM's first statewide customer. 133 HAN is responsible
for communications, and it is an alert system for all hospitals, labs, county
emergency managers, state veterinarians, and several other public health
users of communications. Before switching to the RACOM network, there
was no interoperability between hospital radio communications. 134 Today,
HAN encompasses ninety-nine local public health agencies and 117 local
hospitals across Iowa, all of which can communicate with each other and
with anyone else on the RACOM network.135 Taking a cue from HAN's
success with the RACOM network, the Iowa Department of Agriculture
and the state's law enforcement intelligence system have also switched to
using RACOM's private network.
136
"I am totally convinced now that we may be better off with the
private-public partnership [with RACOM] than just [a] public [solution],"
says Tom Boeckmann, HAN's chief. "If a tower is down, the company's
reputation is on the line. They're not going to put it off to Monday
morning. It's cheaper for us to contract with them for maintenance and just
as stable if not more than if the state was running it itself."'
137
The main concern expressed by skeptical public safety agencies about
131. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116.
132. Id.
133. Telephone Interview with Tom Boeckmann, Chief, Health Alert Network, Iowa
Dept. of Pub. Health (Sept. 15, 2006).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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the RACOM network-and likely the main concern about any private
system-is the reliability of a system that is shared with commercial
customers. For his part, Boeckmann says HAN's users barely ever notice138h
that private customers are on the same network. However, he says, he
did discuss priontization when he first contracted with RACOM.13 9 On the
RACOM network, private users are preempted by public safety whenever
necessary. 140 Priority for public safety is a feature that will be necessary in
any commercial shared public-private network and will be discussed in Part
IV.B, infra.
3. 02 Airwave
Another European private venture is the UK's Airwave public safety
communications network.' 4' It is a nationwide interoperable network that is
privately owned and maintained by the telecommunications firm 02
Wireless. Like the RACOM service, public safety agencies purchase radio
units and subscribe to the network for a monthly fee.
Before the Airwave initiative, most public safety radios in the UK had
• • 142
been deployed in the 1970s and were becoming obsolete. Much like the
U.S. system, public safety agencies there had been historically assigned
different bands of the spectrum and had the autonomy to develop their own
communications systems.' 4 3 "This . . . led to disparate technology
evolution and procurement cycles within each agency, making pragmatic
levels of interoperability difficult to achieve."'
144
In 1993, following a major review of public safety radio
communications, the UK's Home Office decided to develop a new
system. 14 5 It further decided that the new system would be procured on a. • 146
national-rather than local or agency-by-agency-basis. The
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116. PSWAC REPORT, supra
note 10, at 28, app. E. "[RACOM's] [1]aw enforcement radios have 'ruthless preemption'
privileges and can immediately preempt business user channels if law enforcement needs
another channel." Id.
141. See generally Airwave 02 Limited, 02 Airwave Service, http://www.airwaveservic
e.co.uk (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
142. Worrall, supra note 130, at 8.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: AIRWAVE 1 (Apr. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.nao.gov.uk/publications/nao-reports/0 1-02/0102730.pdf
[hereinafter NAO REPORT].
146. See id. at 1, 10. "Local procurements were discounted, since they were unlikely to
achieve any economies of scale in the costs of procurement or in the prices to be paid for the
new systems." Id. at 10.
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government, in consultation with equipment manufacturers, also
determined that the new network would employ the TETRA radio
communications standard. 147 Once built, the Police and Fire Services, as
well as any other public safety agency that wished to opt-in, would share
the new national network. 1
48
The government produced an outline business case for the network
and sought bids from the private sector to build and operate it.1 49 Several
firms competed for the contract, which was ultimately awarded to British
Telecommunications ("BT") in 2000.150 In 2001, BT spun off its public
safety communications business into a separate company called 02. 51 02
completed deployment of the network, called Airwave, in 2005.
Unlike the RACOM network, which is shared by public and private
users, terms of 02's spectrum license require that only organizations with a
public safety mission be allowed to subscribe to Airwave. 152 Ofcom, the
UK's telecommunications regulator, publishes a list of "eligible sharers"
that now includes almost 200 organizations. 53 To become an "eligible
sharer" an organization must apply to Ofcom and demonstrate a public
safety mission.1 54 However, an organization need not be a government
agency to be approved. For example, the Royal Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals ("RSPCA"), a charity that serves much the same
purpose as the American Humane Society, joined the Airwave network in
2006.155 Utilities have also been allowed to join the network. 1 56
Additionally, 02 is not obligated to serve an agency simply because
that agency is on the list, nor is an agency on the list obligated to contract
with 02 for its communications needs. 157 Agencies are free to deploy other
147. See id. (describing the Terrestrial Trunked Radio ("TETRA") as a standard four
digital mobile radio communications developed by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute and designed primarily for public safety use). See also European
Telecommunications Standards Institute, TETRA, http://portal.etsi.org/radio/TETRA/tetra.a
sp (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
148. See NAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 1, 10.
149. Id. at 1, 10-12.
150. See id. at l.
151. Id. at 1, n.a.
152. See id. at 16; 02, Airwave 02 Limited, Using Airwave, http://www.airwaveservice.
co.uk/airwavel 3.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Using Airwave].
153. Ofcom, List of Sharer Organizations (Aug. 2006), http://www.ofcom.org.uk/radio
comms/ifi/licensing/classes/businessradio/emergency/airwavelist.pdf.
154. See NAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 3; Using Airwave, supra note 152.
155. Press Release, Airwave 02 Limited, RSPCA Signs up to the Airwave Service (July
3, 2006), available at http://www.airwaveservice.co.uk/airwavel4_l002.asp.
156. Telephone Interview with Donna Ralston, Head of Civil Contingencies, 02
Airwave (Sept. 12, 2006). See also Ofcom, supra note 153.
157. Using Airwave, supra note 152.
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communications solutions, including building custom networks. 158 02
therefore has an incentive to induce potential subscribers to become its
customers and, in fact, it actively markets to public service agencies that
are not subscribers. 159 Public safety agencies continue to solicit bids from
several companies to provide their communications systems. If 02
succeeds in persuading an agency to join its national interoperable network,
it is only because it provided a positive selective incentive. The ever-
increasing number of interoperable agencies on the Airwave network is
itself, no doubt, a consideration that makes the network selectively
attractive to public safety agencies.
To allow for local flexibility, 02 was required to offer tiered levels of
service. It offers a "Core Service" of interoperable voice communications
that all subscribers receive, and several "Menu Exclusive Services" that are
optional. 16 Agencies can choose locally which, if any, of the additional
services they wish to add to their package (RACOM offers similar optional
services, such as GPS and data applications). 16 1 Finally, there are "Menu
Competitive Services."' 162 These are products and services that can be
provided by 02 or competing firms. There is a competitive market for all
equipment-including handsets, vehicle-mounted radios, and dispatch
terminals-as well as installation, maintenance, and repair. 163 02 also
guarantees that the network will be available 94.3% of the time and will
pay compensation to its subscribers if it is not.164 There are also guarantees
for coverage area and "Menu Exclusive" options to extend coverage if an
agency desires. 1
65
IV. ACHIEVING INTEROPERABILITY
Private commercial provision of public safety communications is not
only possible, but also efficient and, most importantly, addresses the
collective action problem that is the main impediment to interoperability.
As Walky-Talky, RACOM, 02, and their subscribers make evident, public
safety agencies can effectively purchase the communications capacity they
158. Id.
159. Telephone Interview with Donna Ralston, supra note 156.
160. Id.; NAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 11. Optional menu services include extra
capacity for "high risk locations such as football stadia... guaranteed handheld coverage...
and guaranteed in-building penetration." Id. at 12.
161. Telephone Interview with Michael Miller, supra note 114.
162. NAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 11; Telephone Interview with Donna Ralston,
supra note 156.
163. Id.; NAO REPORT, supra note 145, at 11.
164. Telephone Interview with Donna Ralston, supra note 156; NAO REPORT, supra note
145, at 34.
165. Id.
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need from private networks without having to build and maintain their own
custom systems. Users of a shared network are interoperable by default.
Additionally, as RACOM-and to a lesser extent 02 and Walky-Talky-
demonstrate, public safety users can successfully share a network with
private commercial users, thereby broadening economies of scale.
Spectrum segregation is not only unnecessary, but likely harmful as well.
A. Applying the Lessons
The RACOM and 02 approaches address the collective action
problem through positive selective incentives. RACOM's competitive
pricing-as well as the effortless interoperability with other agencies,
utilities, and private parties that it provides-serves as a selective incentive
that induces individual public safety agencies to act in their own self-
interest and, at the same time, become interoperable. 02 also induces
public safety agencies to join its network by offering competitive prices,
interoperability, and service guarantees. However, the European model has
some disadvantages.
% Although public safety organizations are free to contract with other
communications providers, 02 has an advantageous position as Britain's
largest public safety network. Rather than encourage competing and
interconnecting carriers, the UK instead chose to back one interoperable
network that it subsidized with spectrum. It therefore created a single
incumbent in the market. A new entrant wishing to compete on an equal
footing by building out a competing nationwide interoperable
communications network would first have to acquire the spectrum over
which to do it. Unless the new entrant was given the spectrum just as 02
was, it may face a barrier to entry in the form of higher average costs
relative to the incumbent.
166
Additionally, the spectrum license given to 02 restricted the service it
could provide. It specified the technical standard that the new network
166. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). One explanation of this barrier to entry states:
When economies of scale are present, average costs decrease as units of output
increase over a certain range of production. Within that range, even if incumbents
and entrants have the same cost curves, the incumbent may be able to operate at
higher output levels where costs are lower than they are at a potential entrant's
expected level of output, given likely differences in demand. If that is the case,
then as long as it holds its prices even slightly below the entrant's expected cost,
the incumbent can earn supra-competitive profits while ensuring that entry will be
unprofitable. Furthermore, even if the incumbent is pricing at a level high enough
to allow an entrant to earn a profit when new entry occurs, the level of post-entry
competition may increase as a result of the entry, driving prices below the point
where new entrants can survive.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., BARRIERS TO ENTRY 29 (2006).
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would employ, TETRA, rather than simply requiring interoperability and
allowing it to choose or develop a suitable standard. 167 As noted earlier, the
license also limits network subscription to public safety agencies and
therefore curbs possible economies of scale.
In the U.S., Nextel founder Morgan O'Brien's new venture, Cyren
Call, has proposed creating a nationwide interoperable network run by
regional commercial carriers and shared by public safety and private
users.168 Cyren Call advocates the establishment of a "Public Safe
Broadband Trust" to which the FCC would assign 30 MHz of spectrum.
This Trust would be charged with establishing the technical parameters of a
new national network. 17  It would also have the authority to lease the
spectrum to commercial carriers that would build the network to the Trust's
specifications in exchange for the right to deliver commercial broadband
service to urban and rural communities using excess capacity not being
utilized by public safety. 17 1 Both consumer and public safety subscribers
would pay access fees. 172 Between the Broadband Trust and the lessee
carriers there would be a technically proficient network manager, a role
Cyren Call aspires to fill.
173
The spectrum block that Cyren Call seeks is currently slated for
auction. 174 As part of the digital television transition, broadcasters will
return spectrum they currently use in the 700 MHz band to the federal
government. 175 Congress decided that 24 MHz of that returned spectrum
will be given to public safety agencies and the rest-about 60 MHz-will
be auctioned. 176 Cyren Call, however, insists that the 24 MHz of spectrum
set aside by Congress for public safety is unsuitable for its nationwide
interoperable network, and it must instead have 30 MHz of the spectrum
167. Walky-Talky in the Burgenland was similarly limited to the TETRA standard.
Government standards-setting can be troublesome because it invites rent-seeking behavior
from the backers of competing standards.
168. Reallocation of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777-792 MHz) from
Commercial Use, Petition for Rulemaking, FCC Docket No. 06-2278 (Apr. 27, 2006),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor.pdf=pdf&iddocument=651833480
[hereinafter Cyren Call Petition].
169. Id. at v.
170. Id. at vi.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 23.
173. Id. at 34.
174. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke ": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335, 462-82 (2001) (explaining why
auctions are preferable to other methods of spectrum license assignment).
175. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Title III - Digital Television Transition and Public
Safety, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 3003, 120 Stat. 21.
176. Id.
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now set for auction. 17 7 Although Cyren Call's argument is a technical one
beyond the scope of this Article, the fact is that if Cyren Call is successful,
then the amount of spectrum available for efficient market allocation will
be substantially decreased.
Verizon Wireless is also apparently proposing a national public safety
network. 7 8 It has reportedly presented a plan to public safety officials that
would roll out a network over 12 of the 24 MHz set aside for public safety
from the digital television transition. 179 The subscription-based network
would be based on Verizon's existing wireless network, but, like Airwave,
would not be open to private customers. 18 Unlike Cyren Call's proposal,
this scheme would not affect the planned spectrum auctions. However, it
still depends on a no-bid spectrum assignment and would not leverage the
economies of scale made possible by sharing the network with private
users.
Both of these proposals represent a welcome new way of thinking
about interoperability. They recognize the collective action problem
inherent in the balkanization of public safety communications, 18 1 and
attempt to employ market forces to address it. However, the proposals
depend on no-bid grants of spectrum to one provider and thus the creation
of a single incumbent, possibly raising a barrier to competitive entry. 182
Even though Cyren Call's plan envisions contracting with several regional
commercial carriers, there would nevertheless be only one incumbent in
each region.
Verizon's plan, which would employ spectrum already allocated for
177. See Cyren Call Petition, supra note 168, at 10-15.
178. Heather Forsgren Weaver & Jeffrey Silva, Industry Pitches Public-Safety
Alternative, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, at 1, 41.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Cyren Call Petition, supra note 168, at 5.
182. Reallocation of 30 MHz of 700 MHz Spectrum (747-762/777-792 MHz) from
Commercial Use, Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,123, para. 4 (2006) (rejecting Cyren Call's petition
on the grounds that it lacks authority to make the assignment sought). After its petition was
rejected by the FCC, Cyren Call took its plan to Congress. Its plan now calls for the
proposed Public Safety Broadband Trust to purchase the spectrum. The purchase would not
be at auction, but instead for a flat $5 billion price, and it would be backed by federal loan
guarantees. Current and Future Public Safety Communications: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 10th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Harlin R. McEwen, Chairman, Communications and Technology Committee, International
Association of Chiefs of Police), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/__files/
TestimonyHarlinMcEwenChiefsofPoliceSenateTestimonyWrittenMcEwen02O8O7.pdf;
Current and Future Public Safety Communications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Morgan
O'Brien, Chairman, Cyren Call Communications), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1 813&WitnessID=6484.
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public safety use, would not decrease the amount of spectrum available on
the market. However, because its planned network would be limited to
public safety users, it would decrease the amount of spectrum potentially
available to consumers. That is, by forgoing shared use, the Verizon plan
precludes new competition in the commercial market, which the Cyren Call
proposal would provide.
Both the Verizon and Cyren Call plans feature commercial provision
of public safety communications, which is key to addressing the collective
action problem. However, how would competition-and thus lower prices,
higher quality, and sustained innovation-be ensured? One source of
competition to the incumbent created by either plan might be the continued
availability of custom-built systems. However, this would negate any
interoperability gains. Additionally, to the extent we move toward a policy
promoting private provision of public safety communications, local agenc
licenses should be redeployed directly or indirectly to private providers.
To have a true comparable competing network, a new entrant would have
to acquire a spectrum assignment from government on similar terms as the
incumbent. Alternatively, it could employ valuable flexible use spectrum
purchased at market prices. However, as noted earlier, an incumbent who
did not have to pay for its spectrum could pose a barrier to entry.
Theoretically, if agencies were not subsidized with spectrum licenses,
and if flexible use spectrum was freely available on the market, we would
expect to see commercial providers supply public safety's demand for
communications capacity. However, given the existing regulatory
environment, other competing uses of spectrum are likely to be more
profitable than a public safety network. For this reason, we must ensure
through policy that some spectrum be used for public safety. However, as
we will see, we need not allocate spectrum exclusively for public safety
use.
B. Competitive Public Safety Licenses
Putting technical constraints aside, the structure of an ideal
commercial shared-use public safety communications system would be
much like today's wireless telephone network, with multiple competing
national carriers that all interconnect. One way to achieve this would be to
auction two or more spectrum licenses subject to certain public safety
... .. . 184
obligations, including interconnection and prioritization. Creating two or
183. This could be done either by a gradual process in which the federal government
reclaims public safety spectrum as agencies transition to commercial services or by allowing
agencies themselves to lease or sell their licenses in secondary markets.
184. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.2; Weaver & Silva, supra note 178 and accompanying
text (detailing Verizon Wireless' DTV transition plan).
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more licenses would avoid the establishment of a strong incumbent
monopolist. Auctioning the licenses would avoid rent-seeking and could
also potentially raise funds for public safety to use during a transition.
An ideal public safety communications network would also be
national in scope. This would help establish interoperability between
federal, state, and local agencies. It would also help first responders who
travel to other jurisdictions. As Gregg Miller has pointed out, while a
firefighter from California can jump behind the wheel of a fire truck in
Louisiana and drive it with no new instruction, the same cannot be said
about public safety radio systems. 8 5 To this end, as much as possible,
licenses should be national in scope. This would not only address a policy
goal, but, as Hazlett has noted about wireless communication, national
markets are efficient.1
86
From a radically fragmented initial system of thousands of
individually held local licenses, the consumer mobile market consolidated
into six national networks by 2000.187 "The emergence of nationally
integrated networks and calling plans demonstrated that consumers were
demanding services most economically provided on a broader scale. As
larger networks formed, prices plummeted and demand skyrocketed."'
188
The comparison is apt because commercial users of shared networks will
likely demand similar economies of scope.
If achieving interoperability is the ultimate goal, then requiring
interconnection among competing carriers is crucial. It is conceivable that
shared use networks would voluntarily interconnect, if only because
commercial users of the network might demand the benefits of increased
network effects. 189 However, because interoperability will be the prime
objective of a new policy, interconnection should be required between all
licensees.
Another key requirement to which competitive public safety licenses
should be subject is prioritization-giving public safety users priority over
commercial users in shared networks. Bykowsky and Marcus point out that
a network in which private subscribers were subject to preemption by
public safety might look much like interruptible gas or electricity, which
are priced lower than noninterruptible service. Users not sensitive to
random interruptions in power, such as industrial processing facilities, can
185. Telephone Interview with Gregg Miller, supra note 116.
186. See Federal Preemption, supra note 63, at 193.
187. Id. at 193-94.
188. Id. at 196.
189. Gerald W. Brock, Interconnection Policy and Technological Progress, 58 FED.
COMM. L.J. 445, 452 (2006) (explaining that the Internet is unregulated but interconnected).
190. Bykowsky & Marcus, supra note 65, at 18.
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subscribe to the cheaper service and reduce their payments enough to
compensate for the risk. 19 1 Additionally, they can insure against outages by
having generators on standby or by making only a portion of their energy
consumption interruptible and, in case of outage, switching to a slower
processing method that uses noninterruptible energy.192
In a shared network, a public safety user will not preempt a private
call unless every other channel on the network is being used-a rare
situation. For example, our existing public switched telephone network has
prioritization and preemption built in. 19 3 The Department of Homeland
Security runs the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service,
which, in case of emergency, gives priority to certain federal, state, local,
tribal government, industry, and nongovernmental organization telephone
calls. 194 The wireless companion of this program, the Wireless Priority
Service, applies to cellular networks.195 These programs are only used
when the network becomes unforeseeably congested, such as during the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the 9/11 attacks, and the Northeast
blackout of 2003.196 Other times of heavy public service use-such as the
2000 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City-are predictable and can thus be
planned for.
19 7
V. CONCLUSION
As we saw on 9/11, the lack of public safety communications
interoperability has serious consequences. Current public safety spectrum
policy creates about 50,000 independent licensees, which causes a
collective action problem. Because public safety communications users are
balkanized into such a large group, they individually have little incentive to
act in a group-oriented way to achieve interoperability. Additionally,
because public safety agencies are subsidized with spectrum (rather than
budgets that they could use to acquire their communications needs), and
because they are not allowed to sell or lease their spectrum to willing
commercial buyers, it is unlikely a private firm will be able to provide a
competing wireless communications network.
If our goal is a national interoperable public safety communications
191. Id.
192. Id. at 18-19.
193. Marsh, supra note 66, at 14.
194. See GETS Eligibility Criteria, http://www.gets.ncs.gov/eligibility.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2007).
195. See NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, WIRELESS PRIORITY SERVICE, http://gets.
ncs.gov/docs/WPS%20Brochure.pdf.
196. NCS Priority Telecommunications Services: Your Insurance Policy for Critical
Communications, PUB. MGMT., Nov. 2005, at 30-31.
197. Marsh, supra note 66, at 12.
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network with the economies of scale and standardization that such a
network entails, we should reconsider the policies of spectrum
balkanization and apartheid. Public safety agencies should be made to face
the true cost of the spectrum they use, either by allowing them to sell or
lease their spectrum, or through a gradual process of reclamation by the
federal government. At the same time, spectrum should be allocated for
commercial provision of public safety communications. Licensees would
be required to interconnect, and first responders must have priority on
shared networks. At least two competing licensees would help prevent the
establishment of a strong incumbent monopolist.
Walky-Talky and 02 show us that the private provision of
interoperable public safety communications is possible and can act as a
selective incentive that helps evade the collective action problem. In
addition to this, RACOM shows us that first responders and commercial
parties can share such a network, increasing economies of scale, spectral
efficiency, and providing another financial incentive for entrepreneurs to
offer a network. Entrepreneurial firms like RACOM have showed us the
way to interoperability, we only need to change policy to achieve it.
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